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Gender relations remain embedded in their sociopolitical context.
Compared here using event-history analysis is how household di-
visions of paid and unpaid labor affect marital stability in the former
West Germany, where policy reinforced male breadwinner families,
and the United States, where policy remains silent regarding the
private sphere. In Germany, any moves away from separate gen-
dered spheres in terms of either wives’ relative earnings or husbands’
relative participation in housework increase the risk of divorce. In
the United States, however, the more stable couples are those that
adapt by displaying greater gender equity. These results highlight
that policy shapes how gender gets done in the intimate sphere, and
that reinforcement of a gendered division of labor may be detri-
mental to marital stability.
A growing body of evidence indicates that the rules of economic exchange
do not predict who does the housework once wives’ relative earnings
exceed their husbands’. Although the division of housework tends to be-
come more equitable as wives’ relative household earnings increase from
none to about half, it then reverts to a more traditional division as wives
become the primary breadwinner (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Green-
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stein 2000). This latter phenomenon has been attributed to couples’ “do-
ing” gender in their marital relationship (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994).
By doing gender, people actively manage social interactions in light of
normative expectations (Fenstermaker Berk 1985; West and Zimmerman
1987). The division of housework in particular reflects the “material em-
bodiment of wifely and husbandly roles, and derivatively, of womanly
and manly conduct” (West and Zimmerman 1987, p. 144). Consequently,
housework produces both a material and symbolic product of marriage
so that what would seem the fairest division under the rules of exchange
does not necessarily occur within the home (Fenstermaker Berk 1985; see
also Hochschild 1989).
The first contribution of this article is to turn attention to the “So what?”
If the division of housework reflects couples’ negotiation of intimate life,
what is the effect of these negotiations on marital stability? To date re-
search has focused on the effects of the division of paid labor on marital
stability; little is known about effects resulting from the division of unpaid
labor. Two schools of thought theorize the impact of the household division
of labor on marital stability, and these offer competing hypotheses. The
first is that gender specialization benefits family solidarity because it in-
creases couples’ mutual dependence (Becker 1981; Parsons 1942, 1953).
Under this specialization and trading model (Oppenheimer 1997),
women’s employment poses a threat to the benefits of specialization be-
cause it reduces women’s economic dependence upon men, in turn pre-
dicting a greater risk of divorce (Becker 1985). By extension, although
never assessed, husbands’ greater domestic participation also threatens
the mutual dependence created by specialization, and so should also in-
crease the risk of divorce.
The second school of thought evolves from social exchange and bar-
gaining models (Blau 1960; England and Farkas 1986; McElroy and Hor-
ney 1981). Couples negotiate the division of paid and unpaid labor to a
unique equitable distribution within the family based on relative wages,
preferences, and so on. These models hold that alternatives to the marriage
are important determinants of relative bargaining power that influence
possible divisions (McElroy and Horney 1981). In these models, women’s
employment and economic independence more generally increase their
ability to invoke a credible threat of divorce if a more favorable division
of domestic labor cannot be negotiated. Under this dynamic, husbands’
greater domestic participation should decrease the risk of divorce (Breen
and Cooke 2005).
To explore which of these competing hypotheses reflects reality, we first
assess whether husbands’ share of unpaid, domestic tasks increases the
risk of divorce as would be predicted by the specialization and trading
model, or decreases the risk of divorce as predicted by social exchange
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and bargaining models. We then explore the effect of any compensatory
actions that suggest doing gender in the domestic sphere as women’s
relative earnings rise, which falls outside of either model’s prediction.
With the arguments to date, however, we are left with another set of
competing hypotheses. If doing gender in this way represents a process
by which dual-earning couples neutralize gender deviance (Bittman et al.
2003; Greenstein 2000), and doing so is beneficial to marital relations, it
should decrease the risk of divorce. If, instead, wives taking on a greater
share of domestic tasks as their relative earnings exceed their husbands’
reflects a display of relative gender power running counter to what is
perceived as fair under notions of distributive justice, it should increase
the risk of divorce.
Doing gender, however, is an active process reflecting the institutional
shaping of gender relations. Structural and ideological incompatibilities
between the home and workplace limit women’s ability to achieve equity
in either sphere (Ferree 1990; Hartmann 1981). The degree to which
institutional factors reinforce more or less traditional divisions of labor
varies across industrialized societies (Lewis 1992). The second contribution
of this article is to explore how household divisions of labor and any
associated risks of divorce vary in the sociopolitical context. To do so, I
use the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the German
SocioEconomic Panel to compare the risk of divorce among couples as
they marry and negotiate the household division of labor in the United
States, where there is less institutional support for the traditional male
breadwinner model, with West Germany, where there has been strong
institutional support for the traditional gendered division of labor. Panel
data are used, as they are most suitable for assessing the dynamic process
of couple negotiations of the division of labor (Kalleberg and Rosenfeld
1990) as well as the risk of life transitions such as divorce (Allison 1984).
THE HOUSEHOLD DIVISION OF LABOR IN CONTEXT
The desirability of the gendered division of labor—when husbands spe-
cialize in economic production while wives specialize in domestic
(re)production—is judged differently depending upon whether one is the-
orizing about household versus individual outcomes. At the household
level, the specialization and trading model (Oppenheimer 1997) holds that
mutual dependence (Becker 1981) and family solidarity (Parsons 1953)
are created when partners specialize, then trade the fruits of their spe-
cialties. When women are instead economically independent, marriage is
less advantageous to them, and divorce rates are predicted to rise (Becker
1981, 1985).
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Empirical evidence of the direct relationship between women’s em-
ployment and marital instability, however, is mixed (see Rogers 2004).
While some studies report a positive relationship (Becker, Landes, and
Michael 1977; Brines and Joyner 1999; Ruggles 1997; South 2001), others
find that the positive relationship stems from changes in the pool of avail-
able partners (Aberg 2003; South and Lloyd 1995) or only when the mar-
riage is an unhappy one (Schoen et al. 2002). Still other research finds no
significant relationship (Bumpass, Martin, and Sweet 1991; Hoffman and
Duncan 1995; Greenstein 1990, 1995). Consequently, it is not clear that
women’s participation in the employment sphere is directly harmful to
family stability and raises questions about the desirability of specialization
(see also Oppenheimer 1988, 1997).
From an individual perspective, specialization is problematic because
the mutual dependence is not a marker for equality within the marriage
(Goldscheider and Waite 1991). As argued within the social exchange or
bargaining literature, dominant power is held by the person who is less
dependent on the relationship in terms of having attractive alternatives
(Blau 1960; Emerson 1962; Thibaut and Kelley 1959), with economic
resources a primary source of power (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Weber 1958).
Economic resources are more transferable than an investment in a par-
ticular relationship and children, so a woman’s specialization in the do-
mestic sphere reduces her outside alternatives to a given marriage (En-
gland and Farkas 1986). In addition, having children by a prior
relationship is not advantageous to women seeking a new partner, es-
pecially if she requires that the new partner contribute his own resources
to support these children.
Consequently, the gendered division of labor ex ante favors husbands
by giving them direct access to economic resources and superior alter-
natives to the marriage (England 1993). This enables them to negotiate
solutions more favorable to themselves in terms of leisure time and their
assistance with the amount or type of domestic tasks (Blau, Ferber, and
Winkler 2002). There is also evidence that husbands expropriate more of
the family economic resources for their own behalf (Blau et al. 2002),
even those transfers specifically intended for other family members (Lund-
berg, Pollak, and Wales 1997). Further, a wife’s economic dependency
leaves her vulnerable to a husband’s exploitation or abuse and, in the
case of his death or desertion, poverty.
It is not surprising, therefore, that as female wage rates rose after World
War II, women joined the labor force in increasing numbers. About two-
thirds of women ages 15 to 64 across industrialized countries are in the
labor force, although this rate varies from a low of less than 50% in
southern European countries to a high of over 75% in Scandinavian
countries (OECD 2000), with married women’s participation rates even
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more varied (Jaumotte 2003). Under social exchange and bargaining mod-
els, the rising female employment was expected to lead to a revolution in
the gendered division of domestic labor. In the late 1980s, however, Hochs-
child (1989) deemed the revolution “stalled.” Controlling for employment
or earnings, time in domestic tasks changes as women and men move
into and out of different familial states, with women increasing their
housework hours when in unions while men decrease theirs (Gupta 1999a;
South and Spitze 1994).
To explain the anomaly, Fenstermaker Berk (1985) argues that the home
is a “gender factory,” producing and reproducing intimate identities of
masculinity and femininity. “Simultaneously, members ‘do’ gender, as they
‘do’ housework and child care, and what [has] been called the division
of labor . . . is the mechanism by which both the material and symbolic
products of the household are realized” (Fenstermaker Berk 1985, p. 201).
The home is just one arena in which we do gender, but it is the primary
site of our intimate identities and therefore an important one.
The concept of “doing” gender reflects that we are not simply born into
a sex or gender identity or merely functioning in a gender role, but that
gender is a “routine, methodical, and recurring accomplishment” (West
and Zimmerman 1987, p. 126). Social interactions provide the context for
reinforcing the proscribed essentialness of gender. These interactions do
not express natural differences between women and men, but produce
the differences (Goffman 1977). By doing gender, we reflect the social
structure as well as derive relative power consequences of gender category
membership (West and Zimmerman 1987). In this way, as individual
members of society, we actively replicate gender hierarchies in social
interactions.
Historically, the division of labor within industrialized societies pro-
duces and reproduces gender hierarchies (Ferree 1990; Hartmann 1981).
Early in industrialization, policies supporting family wages for men and
marriage bars for women, along with protective legislation limiting
women’s work activities, locations, and hours, all further reinforced men’s
dominance in paid labor (Goldin 1990; Lewis 1992). Despite the elimi-
nation of such explicitly gendered labor force policies across many coun-
tries, gender differences in employment persist, including both horizontal
and vertical segregation and a gender wage gap even after controlling for
education and experience (Blau et al. 2002; Harkness and Waldfogel 1999).
One argument is that women’s continued responsibility for the domestic
sphere inhibits their ability to attain employment equality with men (Fer-
ree 1990; Hartmann 1981; Hobson 1990). So as an interlocking system,
the gendered nature of both paid and unpaid work blocks the ability to
achieve gender equality in either domain (Ferree 1990, p. 874).
As evidence, contrary to the “logic of the pocketbook” (Hochschild
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1989), as women’s earnings exceed those of men, an even more traditional
division of domestic tasks emerges (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994;
Fenstermaker Berk 1985; Greenstein 2000; Hochschild 1989). Brines
(1994) finds that as U.S. wives’ relative earnings increase, they decrease
their hours of domestic tasks in a linear fashion predicted under exchange
models, but their husbands decrease their own as well. She interprets this
as men’s need for “gender display,” with manhood an achieved status put
under threat when wives take on the traditionally male economic role in
the household. Greenstein (2000) finds similar results when using absolute
hours of housework, but when using proportional measures, finds that
both husbands and wives adjust their behavior to more normative di-
visions. He claims that proportional measures are more appropriate, as
they “are more likely to capture the distributive justice or equity aspects
of the division of housework” (Greenstein 2000, p. 325).
Bittman et al. (2003) also find that Australian and U.S. couples do
gender in terms of compensating behavior in the division of domestic
tasks as wives’ earnings exceed their husbands’, but in Australia, it is the
women who compensate by increasing their domestic hours. The authors
offer the explanation that Australian women’s corrective response is larger
than that found for U.S. women because institutional differences make
women’s primary breadwinning more anomalous in Australia than in the
United States. The “family wage” central to strong male breadwinner
nation-states was part of Australian governmental wage setting
(O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999).
Consequently, while “doing” gender occurs in interactions at the indi-
vidual level, its patois derives from the institutional setting, with correc-
tive action more pronounced where more traditional gender roles have
been reinforced by policy. This proposition that policy alters the ways in
which couples negotiate the household division of labor bears elaboration
and further testing.
Doing Gender in Its Policy Context
Jane Lewis (1992) suggests classifying countries as ranging from “strong”
to “weak” male breadwinner states by the extent to which policy reinforces
men’s preferential access to employment and women’s responsibility for
the unpaid care work in the private sphere. Germany is the ideal-typical
strong male breadwinner state (Lewis 1992). At the end of World War II,
West Germany founded a new political system based on “natural law”
(Naturrecht), stemming from a “pre-political” patriarchal order ordained
by God (Moeller 1993). Strengthening the patriarchal family as an insti-
tution dominated West German federal policy under Konrad Adenauer
during the 1950s and 1960s, with social provisions favoring male bread-
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winners with nonworking wives (Gerhard 1992; Ostner 1992; Zimmerman
1993). Income splitting for taxation purposes, particularly beneficial to
high-income, single-earner families, was introduced in 1958. In 1961,
mothers were deemed the only satisfactory educators of their children, so
that schools were subsequently set up to finish after two hours on one
day, six the next, and were closed over the lunch hour (Ostner 1993; von
Oertzen 1999). A 1966 federal report highlighted gender disparities in
educational attainment and concluded that women were failing to exploit
fully their right of education—to the detriment of the education of the
next generation (von Oertzen 1999). Until 1977, domestic responsibilities
continued to be recognized as West German women’s legal duty (Hantrais
1994).
West German women’s educational attainment and employment lagged
during this time. Fewer West German women than men graduated from
the highest secondary school tracks and went on to university, and there
are clear gender differences in the type of occupational training selected
(Geschka 1990). At the time of economic unification with East Germany
in 1990, only 44% of West German married women were employed, and
only half of this percentage were employed full-time (Ostner 1993).
In contrast, U.S. policy since World War II has primarily reflected the
liberal tradition and addressed women’s ability to compete in the labor
market.2 Employment, training, and education discrimination on the basis
of gender became illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
During the 1970s, laws expanded enforcement of this legislation, pro-
moting equal educational opportunities and job training. U.S. women’s
secondary completion rates have historically been higher than those of
their male counterparts. Since 1982, more bachelor’s degrees have been
conferred on U.S. women than men, women earn more associate and
master’s degrees than men, and they are coming close to parity in first-
professional and doctoral degrees (U.S. Department of Education 2000).
These policies also encourage U.S. women’s labor force participation, with
two-thirds of U.S. married women with children ages 6 to 17 employed,
as are almost 60% of married women with children under the age of 6
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2004). Unlike West German policy, U.S.
policy remains silent regarding who is responsible for the private sphere
(Leibfried and Ostner 1991). This is not to say that gender equality is a
given with liberal market economies (see Hartmann 1981), just that a
gendered division of domestic labor is not specifically reinforced by U.S.
policy.
2 Feminist or reformer concerns for women as mothers also play a key role in U.S.
policy, particularly at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Orloff
(1996) provides a review of the scholarship documenting this era.
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From these divergent policy paths, the institutional framework defining
where gender should be “done” vis-a`-vis the division of labor varies across
the countries. Not surprisingly, on attitudinal surveys West Germans ex-
press greater support for the traditional gendered division of labor than
do U.S. persons (Breen and Cooke 2005). Analyzed here is the extent to
which these more traditional attitudes translate into more traditional
household divisions of labor within West German as compared with U.S.
couples, and whether different divisions of labor alter the risk of divorce
for couples in either country.
THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND MARITAL STABILITY
The specialization and trading model relates women’s rising employment
to rising risk of divorce but has not explicitly predicted effects of husbands’
greater domestic contribution. If specialization creates an essential mutual
dependence, it can be deduced within this framework that men’s increas-
ing domestic contribution undermines specialization and so would also
be predicted to increase the risk of divorce.
In contrast, social exchange (Blau 1960), contract (England and Farkas
1986), and game theoretic bargaining models (Manser and Brown 1980;
McElroy and Horney 1981) view the observed household division of labor
as the result of couple negotiations that reflect each person’s relative power
and resources. Divorce is not the given outcome but forms the lower bound
of an acceptable outcome, a person’s threat point, or BATNA (best al-
ternative to a negotiated agreement). If women find themselves unable to
negotiate a favorable division of domestic tasks, economically independent
women are able to then leave the marriage. As more women gain economic
independence, more are able to threaten divorce (Breen and Cooke 2005).
This suggests that the higher divorce rates since World War II are not
reflecting just effects of women’s rising employment; they reflect men’s
resistance to changing their domestic behavior in response to women’s
rising employment. Lennon and Rosenfeld (1994) find that women with
more alternatives to the marriage perceive unequal divisions of domestic
tasks as unfair, whereas women with fewer alternatives report greater
acceptance of the situation. Schoen et al. (2002) find that U.S. women’s
employment only increases the risk of divorce when the marriage is an
unhappy one. More than two decades ago, Huber and Spitze (1980) found
that while wives’ thoughts of divorce increase with their own employment,
they decrease with husbands’ increasing housework contribution. To date,
however, analyses of the effect of wives’ employment on divorce have
not controlled for possible countervailing effects of husbands’ domestic
contribution. If the social exchange and bargaining predictions are correct,
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husbands’ greater share of domestic tasks should decrease the risk of
divorce.
It should be noted that Lundberg and Pollak (1993, 1994) question
whether divorce is the true threat point in family bargaining. They argue
that even if couples cannot reach agreement, there are still benefits such
as shared living economies and enjoyment of the children that make
divorce a less desirable alternative. They suggest that failing agreement,
couples first revert to a noncooperative strategy reflecting the traditional
roles under the gendered division of labor. The absence of cooperation in
marriage, however, results in either a poorly maintained home or fewer
children, since a woman will only produce what she can manage on her
own (Lundberg and Pollak 1993). There is evidence of these dynamics
across countries. Couples in which the husband contributes less to house-
work or childcare have a lower risk of second children in Germany (Cooke
2004), Hungary, Sweden (Ola´h 2003), and, depending on wives’ employ-
ment status, the United States (Torr and Short 2004). Consequently, only
the effects of the division of housework on likelihood of divorce shall be
analyzed here.
Neither the specialization and trading nor social exchange and bar-
gaining models offer predictions for the effects of compensating behavior
on the risk of divorce. For this we link the hypothesized reasons for doing
gender in the household division of labor to possible family effects. Bitt-
man et al. (2003) and Greenstein (2000) argue that the compensating
behavior in the form of a woman’s greater domestic share when she is
also the primary breadwinner neutralizes gender deviance in a marriage.
If minimizing this deviance is essential not only to intimate identities but
to relationship stability, doing gender in this way should decrease the risk
of divorce. If, instead, the rules of exchange and distributive justice dom-
inate in successful couples, female breadwinners compensating by taking
on a greater share of domestic tasks might be performing a stop-gap
measure within an inherently unfair situation. If so, the risk of divorce
should be higher in couples exhibiting the compensating division of do-
mestic tasks than in couples where there is gender equity. By gender equity
we refer to when wives’ relative contribution to earnings is the same as
husbands’ relative contribution to housework, ranging from zero, where
wives contribute nothing to earnings and husbands contribute nothing to
housework, to 100, indicating women are the breadwinners while hus-
bands assume all domestic tasks.
The effects of the household divisions of paid and unpaid labor on
couples’ risk of divorce are compared in the United States and the former
West Germany to see whether they vary as policy support for the male
breadwinner model has varied. For this to be a meaningful comparison,
the propensity to divorce in each country must be similar, so we observe
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differences in effects, not differences in overall likelihood of divorce. Dur-
ing the 1980s, the divorce rate in West Germany was just 30% as compared
with the U.S. rate at nearly 50%, but the West German rate has been
rising. More recent statistics suggest that the current incidence of divorce
is quite similar in the two countries, at 49.1 divorces per 100 marriages
in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2000) as compared with 46.0
divorces per 100 marriages in unified Germany (EUROSTAT 2000).3
As illustrated in figure 1, attitudes toward marriage and divorce are
also highly similar in the two countries. The figure displays the mean
reports by country for three questions from the 1994 International Social
Survey Program that assess attitudes about marriage and divorce: (1)
married people are generally happier than single people, (2) a bad marriage
is better than being single, and (3) divorce is the best solution to a bad
marriage. In both countries, the samples tend not to agree that married
people are happier, strongly disagree that a bad marriage is preferable to
being single, and moderately agree that divorce is the best solution to a
bad marriage, with West Germans slightly more likely to agree than U.S.
respondents.
DATA
Wives’ relative earnings, work hours, husbands’ share of domestic tasks,
number of children, and the risk of divorce vary across the marital life
course. The most suitable way to assess these dynamic relationships is
with event-history analysis (Allison 1984; Yamaguchi 1991), which re-
quires longitudinal data. The German SocioEconomic Panel (GSOEP)
and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) are selected for the
analyses.
The GSOEP is a longitudinal study of private German households
where all household members over the age of 16 are interviewed annually
for data on the preceding year. The first wave occurred in 1984 with a
representative sample of 12,290 people in 5,921 households in the former
West Germany. In June 1990, sampling extended into the former East
Germany, but East Germans shall not be included in this analysis as the
male breadwinner model was not institutionally reinforced in that region.
3 Part of the current divorce rate in unified Germany might be attributable to the
higher historical rate in the former East Germany. Yet following the economic uncer-
tainty of unification, East Germans were less likely for a time either to marry or divorce
than were West Germans (Mu¨nz and Ulrich 1995). The most recent statistics available
suggest that the number of divorces as compared with number of marriages is now
higher in the former West La¨nder than in the former East (http://www.statistik-
portal.de/Statistik-Portal/en/en_jb01_jahrtab3.asp).
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Fig. 1.—West German (left column) and U.S. (right column) attitudes toward divorce.
Based on 1994 International Social Survey Program data, reflecting mean country scores
on the questions ranging from 1, strongly agree, to 5, strongly disagree.
The constitution adopted by East Germany in 1949 enforced women’s
right and obligation to work, supported by extensive policy provisions
enabling women to combine work and having children (Moeller 1993;
Ostner 1993; Zimmerman 1993). After unification, economic constraints
dramatically increased unemployment in East Germany and made East
Germans less likely to make any family transition—into or out of marriage
(Mu¨nz and Ulrich 1995; Witte and Wagner 1995). Too few East German
couples in the sample married (69) and divorced (21) during the obser-
vation window to conduct separate East German analyses.
The PSID is a longitudinal study of U.S. individuals and the family
units in which they reside, beginning in 1968 with a representative sample
of 4,800 families in which the head only is normally interviewed. Although
two thousand Latino households were added to the panel in 1990, they
were subsequently dropped in 1995 and a new, much smaller immigrant
sample added. Consequently, the only ethnic differentiation possible in
the analysis here is when respondents are black. Historically, the rate of
marital dissolution has been greater for black couples (Hoffman and Dun-
can 1995; Ruggles 1997).
From each data set, we select couples marrying for the first time be-
tween 1985 and 1995 for which there is at least one year of data following
the marriage. These couples are followed through 1997 in the United
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States and 2000 in Germany.4 The year 1985 is selected for the beginning
of the observation window, as it is the second year of GSOEP data col-
lection. The same year is selected for the PSID data in order to follow
couples in both countries during the same historical time period. Couples
already married as of 1985 are excluded from analysis, since their inclusion
biases results with marriages of longer duration and would not provide
an accurate portrayal of family dynamics affecting the risk of divorce for
all couples from the beginning of their marriage. For example, in Green-
stein’s (2000, p. 327) sample drawn from the National Survey of Families
and Households, the average marriage duration was 17 years, whereas
in 1990, the median U.S. first-marriage duration was approximately eight
years (National Center for Health Statistics 1995).
In both panels, new members marrying into the sample can be assigned
a weight of zero if they are not within the original sampling frame. For
this reason, unweighted data are used for the analysis, although a com-
parison of weighted and unweighted sample descriptive statistics indicates
that the two are highly similar. As a result, the analytical samples appear
representative of German and U.S. couples marrying during the time
period.
The West German sample includes 559 couples, yielding an analytic
sample of 4,483 couple-years, reduced to 3,524 due to listwise deletion of
missing data primarily because information on a couple was not available
in all years. Subsequent analysis using indicator variables for when data
are missing indicates robustness of key effects. While 1,122 Caucasian
and 368 black U.S. persons in the panel married during the observation
window, many did not continue reporting in subsequent years, so the
analytical sample is compsed of 506 couples (388 Caucasian and 118
black), or 4,204 couple-years. When indicator variables are included for
the missing data, key U.S. effects remain robust, although the significance
levels of some control variables change. Further, Lillard and Panis (1994)
report that biases from sample attrition in the PSID when analyzing
marital dissolution are generally mild. Also, demographics and the divi-
sion of labor derived from the PSID sample used here have been compared
with cross sections of other more recently fielded surveys (National Survey
of Families and Households and the International Social Survey Program)
and appear similarly representative.
In the data set, each year of a couple’s marriage is a distinct observation,
beginning with the first year of marriage and concluding with either
divorce or separation (which are not distinguished in this analysis given
4 The PSID changed in 1997 to be conducted biannually, and the core sample was
reduced by almost 30%. This created substantial missing data in the 1999 and inbe-
tween waves, so I decided to end the U.S. observation window in 1997.
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the variation in required waiting periods between separation and divorce),
or the final observation year in the panel. Constructing couple-years in
this way automatically incorporates the time-varying aspects of the in-
dependent variables, but also violates the assumption that error terms
not be correlated. Consequently, robust standard errors clustering on a
unique couple identification number are used.
Variables
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
analyses. These statistics are based on the couple-year files constructed
for the event-history analyses, so the values of the time-varying variables
represent averages over the observed years of marriage, not a snapshot
of couples in any given year of marriage.
Dependent variable.—The dependent variable is a binary variable in-
dicating whether a couple reports a divorce or separation in a given year.
Once a divorce occurs, the couple is removed from analysis as they are
no longer at risk of divorce. During the time period, 201 West German
couples reported divorcing, and 223 U.S. couples (153 white and 90 black)
reported divorcing. These aggregate figures suggest the divorce rate in
Germany is higher than in the United States, when as noted earlier it is
roughly similar in the two countries. The U.S. couples, however, are being
followed for three years less than their German counterparts. As the event-
history models control for the effect of time on the risk of divorce, it will
be possible to see whether the shorter U.S. observation window is the
reason the observed U.S. sample divorce rates appear lower.
Independent variables: Women’s employment.—In both panels, partic-
ipants are interviewed in a given year to ascertain information about their
lives over the past 12 months. To ensure that causes of divorce are dif-
ferentiated from effects, values of the time-varying independent variables
are lagged by one year. For example, if a woman is in the process of
establishing her own household, her share of household earnings would
rise, leading to the erroneous conclusion that her greater earnings caused
the transition rather than resulted from it. Similarly, total household in-
come would decrease as dual-earner couples become single heads of house-
hold. In a troubled marriage, both partners may also reduce their time
spent in household tasks as commitment to the marital home declines.5
5 Comparing models using lagged versus unlagged independent variables, these sorts
of differences are borne out (results available from the author). The substantive effect
of U.S. wives’ relative earnings is larger when using unlagged variables, the effect of
U.S. husbands’ share of housework is smaller and becomes statistically insignificant,
and the prophylactic effect of total household income is much larger in both countries.
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TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations for West German and U.S. Couple
Independent and Control Variables Used in Event-History Models of
Divorce
West Germany United States
Wife’s share of labor earnings (0–100) . . . . . . . . . . . 18.24 32.18
(25.71) (24.12)
Husband’s share of housework (0–100) . . . . . . . . . . 28.47 33.05
(18.82) (24.58)
Husband’s share of housework, squared . . . . . . . . . 1,165 1,697
(1,340) (2,349)
Wife’s weekly work hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.63 28.15
(18.15) (15.74)
Wife’s weekly hours of housework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.80 17.40
(15.05) (14.78)
Total household income (000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74.96 48.85
(40.66) (44.84)
Length of marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.39 4.57
(3.43) (2.91)
Husband’s weekly work hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39.74 41.59
(14.47) (13.35)
Wife’s age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.25 30.23
(5.13) (5.98)
Number of children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.65 1.00
(.94) (1.01)
Wife out of labor force (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58 .09
Wife with university (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 .25
Husband with university (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 .27
Own home (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 .53
Wife earns 1 50%#husband does ≤ 50%
housework (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .07 .08
Equitable division (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04 .14
Husband black (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA .24
N couples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522 1,490
N couple-years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,483 9,633
Note.—These statistics are based on the event-history file for risk of divorce from year of marriage,
representing valid couple-years in the observation window. Total household income is in the local currency.
Most analyses of women’s employment on the likelihood of divorce
assume that effects are linear by using a single continuous measure of
women’s hours of employment or wages. It is possible, however, that
being a housewife is a fundamentally different state than being a part-
or full-time working wife, particularly when comparing two countries
with varying support for the traditional division of paid labor. The tra-
ditional family might also, in turn, carry different risks of divorce. To
assess these effects, a binary variable is included for when the wife is out
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of the labor force, against a referent of wives who are employed.6 If
specialization is optimal for marital stability, these traditional couples
should have a lower risk of divorce than dual-earner couples. Further, as
the male breadwinner model has been reinforced more in Germany than
in the United States, there should be more of these couples in Germany.
As displayed in table 1, over half of West German wives are out of the
labor force at some time during the observed years of marriage, as com-
pared with less than 10% of U.S. wives.
To keep the metrics for the division of paid and unpaid labor com-
mensurate, a wife’s contribution to the family labor earnings is measured
as a percentage (0–100) of the combined labor earnings of the wife and
husband. This measure is perfectly correlated with the relative depen-
dency measure developed by Sorensen and McLanahan (1987) used in
other analyses predicting the division of housework (Brines 1994; Green-
stein 2000). As shown in table 1, across all couples, the average household
earnings contribution of U.S. wives is almost twice that of West German
wives: 32% versus 18%, respectively.
Wives’ hours of paid work are included to control for the time demands
employment places on them that are theorized to alter the division of
housework separately from the effects of their relative earnings (Blood
and Wolfe 1960; South and Spitze 1994). Other things being equal, the
more hours worked in the market, the fewer available for housework.
Time constraints have proven important in predicting second births
among German couples, an effect in addition to women’s earnings’ effects
(Cooke 2004).7
Division of housework.—The German data have variables for each
partner’s reported weekly domestic hours, including housework, running
errands, yard work and repairs, and child care, both during the week
and the average hours on Saturday and on Sunday. The measure of house-
work used here is calculated as the time spent in all tasks with the ex-
ception of child care throughout the week. Child care is excluded as there
is no similar measure within the PSID, but Cooke (2004) finds that German
fathers’ relative contribution to child care proves insignificant in altering
the risk of divorce.
The PSID measure of housework is more limited in two ways. First,
in contrast to the GSOEP, the PSID normally relies on a single primary
6 Doing so proves important to ascertaining true effects, for when not differentiating
for when women are out of the labor force, the effect of women’s relative earnings
appears much smaller because it is camouflaging the higher risk of divorce among
U.S. couples where the wife is out of the labor force.
7 The models were run with and without women’s work hours with no substantive or
significant changes in other effects or the fit of the model, but were left in for the
theoretical reasons stated above.
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adult—usually the male adult head if there is one—to provide information
for all family members. Most evidence indicates that respondents over-
estimate their own housework time and underestimate the time contri-
bution of others (Shelton and John 1996), with Press and Townsley (1998)
finding that husbands’ reports are less accurate than wives’. The extent
of the possible U.S. husband-only reporting bias was analyzed by com-
paring a cross section of the longitudinal sample with a sample from one
of the few PSID dual-respondent surveys (1985; results available from
the author). That analysis indicates that while U.S. husbands do tend to
underestimate their wives’ housework hours, the relative division of
housework is fairly represented in the data once controlling for husbands’
reports of wives’ estimated weekly housework hours, so there are no
significant biases introduced in the model used here.
The second limitation of the PSID is that it contains a single question
asking the respondent to estimate how many hours are spent in “house-
work, excluding child care” each week. These data were used in the
analyses by both Brines (1994) and Gupta (1999b) to reveal that at the
extreme of a husband’s dependence on his wife, there is evidence of gender
display. A single measure does not provide the detail of the German data,
nor is it as rich as the series of questions asked of U.S. respondents on
the National Survey of Families and Households and analyzed by Green-
stein (2000).8 None of these are as precise as the time diary data used by
Bittman et al. (2003) in their analysis of Australian couples. But despite
the wide range in the crudeness of the housework measure, results are
remarkably consistent in terms of the extent of equity or compensatory
behavior made evident with them. Consequently, concern for the quality
of the housework measure appears more philosophical than applicable to
the analysis.
Husbands’ relative domestic participation is measured by dividing their
weekly hours in housework by the combined household hours of the wife
and husband, yielding their percentage share of domestic tasks ranging
from 0 to 100. Also included is the square of this term to test for nonlin-
earity. If the squared term is positive and significant, this indicates that
husbands’ greater relative housework contribution at some point begins
to increase the risk of divorce. A relative rather than absolute housework
measure is used because of Greenstein’s (2000) evidence that compensating
behavior is more evident when controlling for the relative rather than the
absolute housework contribution of each. As also noted by Greenstein
8 Although the National Survey of Families and Households collects more detailed
information on household tasks for each family member, it has only conducted three
waves several years apart (1987–88, 1992–94, and 2001–2002), which makes it less
suitable than the PSID for conducting event-history analyses of divorce.
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(2000), perceptions of fairness and distributive justice are related to the
relative, not total amount.
Women’s reported housework hours are included to control for the
husband-only reporting bias in the PSID, as well as to control for when
men’s share of housework is greater because women’s own housework
hours decline when they are employed (Bianchi et al. 2000; Goldscheider
and Waite 1991; Shelton and John 1996). Including this measure does not
create a problem of multicollinearity with women’s hours of employment,
however, because while employed women’s housework hours adjust to
reflect competing time demands, the sharpest drop in housework hours
since the 1960s has been among women who are out of the labor force
(Gershuny 2000).9
As evident in table 1, German wives spend more hours in housework
on average than their U.S. counterparts (29 and 17 hours, respectively),
although this could be due to the higher proportion of housewives in the
German sample. Overall, the gendered division of housework appears
roughly similar in the two countries, with husbands in each country per-
forming about one-third of the housework as has been found in other
cross-national studies (Gershuny 2000). Husbands’ share of housework
when wives are employed is less similar in the two countries, with U.S.
husbands claiming to perform 44% as compared with German husbands
performing 38%.10
The above measures enable us to assess the economic exchange rela-
tionship between the household division of labor and risk of divorce
predicted by bargaining models, but not whether compensatory behavior
in the division of domestic tasks reduces the risk of divorce when the
wife’s earnings exceed her husband’s. To assess this, an interaction in-
dicator variable is created for when wives’ relative earnings exceed 50%
and husbands’ share of housework does not exceed 50%. In Germany,
only 13% of wives earn more than their husbands, compared with 24%
of U.S. wives. As can be seen in table 1, roughly half of these German
female-breadwinning couples but just one-third of U.S. female-bread-
winning couples compensate for wives’ higher earnings by doing gender
in this way (7% of the German and 8% of the U.S. samples). This is
consistent with Bittman et al.’s (2003) Australian evidence that compen-
sating behavior in the domestic sphere is more common in strong male
breadwinner states.
9 Including women’s housework hours significantly improves the fit of the model, but
does not substantively or significantly alter effects of other variables.
10 Disability or poor health can also alter the household division of labor, but only one
or two of these younger first-married couples report that one of the partners is in ill
health or is disabled in any given year.
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Control variables.—Controls for a wife’s age, number of children, total
family income, home ownership, and college or university attainment are
included in the models. According to models of assortative mating, people
who are older at marriage are less likely to divorce because of a decrease
in possible future marital partners (Becker et al. 1977). But culturally
defined bargaining disadvantages specific to women at older ages also
exist. In many industrialized societies, youth and beauty prove valued
characteristics of women and less important for the marriage prospects
of men (England and Farkas 1986; Parsons 1942). Youth by definition
disappears with age, so women lose their bargaining advantage over time
regardless of any other factors. A variable is included here to control for
women’s age. In both country samples, wives are, on average, 30 years
old.
Persons with higher-valued characteristics such as university education
or wealth gain more from marriage and are therefore less likely to divorce
net of other factors (Becker et al. 1977). The log of total household income
is included to control for wealth of the family. Men’s education level is
positively associated with their domestic participation (South and Spitze
1994), whereas other studies find no association (Kamo 1991; McAllister
1990), or that the effect disappears once gender ideology is included (Kamo
1994). Women’s greater educational attainment is associated with less time
in domestic tasks (Blair and Lichter 1991; South and Spitze 1994), and
is normally interpreted as an education effect on ideology. There is some
U.S. evidence that the historical effect of wife’s greater educational at-
tainment lowering the risk of divorce is attenuating in younger cohorts
(South 2001). A binary variable is created for women or men with college
or university education, against a referent of less than college.
In neoclassical economic models of marriage, children and home own-
ership represent accrued “marital goods,” so they predict a lower risk of
divorce (Becker 1981). One might also argue that more stable couples are
more willing to purchase a home together or have additional children,
suggesting these might reflect a selection bias. Number of children in the
family in a given year is entered into the models as a continuous variable.
Home ownership is measured with a binary variable indicating when a
couple owns their home, against a referent of renting.
The risk of divorce can change as a function of time, irrespective of
the independent variables, so a variable is included for years since mar-
riage. This also enables assessment of whether the observed country dif-
ferences in the incidence of divorce relative to sample size reported earlier
are a function of time. A piecewise constant model including a series of
year binary variables representing two to three, three to four, four to five,
and five or more years from year of marriage was also tried, but any
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significant time effects in the respective countries proved to be essentially
linear during the observed years of marriage.
In the U.S. model, a binary variable is also included indicating when
the husband is black, against a referent of when the husband is Caucasian.
Racial marital homogamy is high: 95% of black women are married to
black men and 99% of Caucasian women are married to Caucasian men.
FINDINGS: THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND RISK OF DIVORCE
The changes in the log odds that a West German or U.S. couple will
divorce are presented in table 2. Discussion focuses on effects of the
variables measuring the household division of labor. Two models are
presented: one modeling the effects of the household division of labor
using continuous measures, and the second adding the indicator term for
when husbands perform half or less of domestic tasks when wives earn
more than half of the couple’s labor income.
Effects of the Household Division of Labor
Results for model 1 indicate specialization is optimal for marital stability
in West Germany, but not in the United States. While male breadwinner
couples in both countries are more likely to divorce, the effect only reaches
statistical significance in the United States. Women’s rising relative earn-
ings also predict a rising risk of divorce, with the effect twice the mag-
nitude in the United States as in Germany. Each percentage point increase
in a wife’s earnings as a percentage of her and her husband’s total labor
earnings increases the log odds of divorce by 1% in West Germany and
2% in the United States. Together these results suggest that the male
breadwinner couples reinforced by policy are the most stable in West
Germany, whereas dual-earner couples are the most stable in the United
States provided a woman’s earnings do not exceed her husband’s. In the
United States, being a male breadwinner couple increases the log odds
of divorce by 0.83, comparable to the increase in risk when a wife is
earning more than 41% of the family’s labor income ( wife’s41# 0.02
earnings effect). So reliance on a primary breadwinner of either gender
among U.S. couples proves more precarious than when there are two
more equal earners in the family.
These relative employment effects, however, do not take into account
possible countervailing effects of the division of housework, for which
there are also marked country differences. German husbands’ increasing
share of housework linearly increases the risk of divorce across the entire
range (i.e., the quadratic term is insignificant). In contrast, U.S. husbands’
TABLE 2
Coefficients from Discrete-Time Logistic Regression of Marital Dissolution from Year of Marriage
West Germany United States
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Log Odds Robust SE Log Odds Robust SE Log Odds Robust SE Log Odds Robust SE
Wife’s proportional earnings (0–100) . . . . . . . .01* .00 .01* .01 .02** .01 .02*** .01
Wife out of labor force (0 p employed) . . . .62 .48 .60 .47 .83* .39 .99* .41
Wife’s weekly work hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00 .01 .00 .01 .01 .01 .00 .01
Husband’s % housework (0–100) . . . . . . . . . . . .01* .00 .01* .01 .04*** .01 .04*** .01
Husband’s % housework, squared . . . . . . . . . .0003* .00 .0002 .00
Wife’s weekly hours housework . . . . . . . . . . . . .01 .01 .01 .01 .03* .01 .03* .01
Number of children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57*** .12 .57*** .12 .11 .13 .09 .13
Log of total household income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 .09 .12 .09 .06 .11 .05 .12
Wife with college or university . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74† .43 .70 .45 .13 .38 .20 .39
Husband with college or university
(0 p less than college or university) . . . . . .04 .30 .00 .30 1.38** .51 1.38** .53
Home ownership (0 p rent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 .22 .23 .23 1.23*** .31 1.23*** .31
Wife’s age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01 .03 .01 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03
Years since marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .03 .04 .03 .04 .16** .05 .16** .05
Black (U.S.) couple (0 p white) . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 .24 .31 .24
Husband does ! 50% housework
#wife earns 1 50% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01 .37 2.25** .75
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.10 1.42 2.10 1.42 1.92 1.28 2.20 1.40
Log likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499 499 378 369
Wald x2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44.44** 44.48*** 107.00*** 114.25***
N couple-years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,524 3,524 4,204 4,204
N couples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559 559 506 506
* , two-tailed tests.P ! .05
** .P ! .01
*** .P ! .001
† .P ! .10
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increasing housework contribution significantly decreases the risk of di-
vorce to more than offset the effect of wives’ earnings. But the U.S.
quadratic term is also significant, so once U.S. husbands’ housework and
wives’ earnings contributions exceed about 30%, the risk of divorce again
begins to increase. Yet the net effect of husbands’ housework contributions
equaling wives’ relative earnings still predicts lower log odds of divorce
until both exceed 83%, which is an extremely nontraditional division of
paid and unpaid labor.
These effects are depicted in figure 2, which plots changes in the log
odds of divorce for percentage point changes in wives’ relative earnings
matched by identical changes in husbands’ share of housework (i.e., when
wives contribute 10% of earnings, husbands’ share of housework is also
10%; when wives contribute half to earnings, husbands are doing 50%
of the housework, etc.), controlling for other significant effects related to
the division of labor. In other words, it plots changes in the predicted risk
of divorce when couples negotiate a division of paid and unpaid labor
reflecting distributive justice. At the origin, indicating male breadwinner
couples, the single black diamond is the U.S. coefficient, which is slightly
above the gray circle indicating the German coefficient for risk of divorce.
Only here, comparing male breadwinner couples, is the relative risk of
divorce lower in West Germany than in the United States. All other more
egalitarian divisions of paid and unpaid labor increase the risk of divorce
in West Germany whereas they reduce the risk of divorce in the United
States.
The second model in table 2 displays effects of compensatory domestic
behavior attributed to couples doing gender to neutralize gender deviance
when wives become the primary breadwinner (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines
1994). For the German couples, when wives perform a greater share of
housework as their relative earnings exceed 50%, the negative effects
associated with her greater relative earnings remain unaltered. For U.S.
couples, this compensatory behavior at the extreme nontraditional divi-
sion of paid labor predicts a much lower risk of divorce. This suggests
that there are positive effects for gender equity in the U.S. household
division of labor until parity is reached, but neutralizing gender deviance
has a prophylactic effect among those few women who are primary bread-
winners. Yet even under this compensating scenario, the remaining sig-
nificance of the effect for husbands’ housework share indicates that these
nontraditional couples are most stable when husbands perform some share
of the housework.11
11 From coefficients in table 2, model 2: U.S. female breadwinner, husband contributes
half to domestic tasks p [(100#0.02 wife’s earnings)  (0.04#50 husband’s share
of domestic) (0.03#13.50 employed wife’s mean housework hours)2.25 wives’
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Fig. 2.—Effect of earnings and housework exchange on U.S. and West German couples’
log odds of divorce. Calculated from coefficients in table 2. The plots reflect the change in
the log odds of divorce for percentage point changes in U.S. and German husbands’ share
of housework matching wives’ relative earnings, controlling for significant effects of hus-
bands’ housework share squared, male breadwinner couples, and wives’ mean hours of
housework when employed or out of the labor force.
In summary, German traditional male breadwinner families are pre-
dicted to be the most stable in that country. Any other divisions of paid
and unpaid labor, even compensatory ones wherein a female breadwinner
would retain responsibility for domestic tasks, increases the risk of divorce.
In contrast, the rules of distributive justice appear to dominate among
these first-married U.S. couples until relative earnings approach a non-
traditional extreme. When wives’ relative earnings exceed their hus-
bands’, couples can reduce the risk of divorce if wives continue to perform
a share of the housework. Further, when controlling for other significant
effects related to the division of labor, U.S. female breadwinner families
where the woman does half the housework have a lower risk of divorce
than German male breadwinner couples.12
compensatory domestic share effect in that the husband does no more than half] p
2.66. Female breadwinner husband does nothing p [(100#0.02 wife’s earnings) 
(0.03#13.50 employed wife’s mean housework hours)  2.25 interaction effect
that the husband does no more than half of domestic tasks] p 0.66.
12 From coefficients in table 2, model 2: being a German male breadwinner couple
predicts no net change in the risk of divorce. Computing for being a U.S. female
breadwinner couple where the husband contributes half to domestic tasks yields a
substantial decrease in the log odds of divorce ([(100#0.02 wife’s earnings) 
(0.04#50 husband’s share of domestic)  (0.03#13.50 employed wife’s mean
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Other Household Bargaining Effects
The primary interest here is to compare effects of divisions of paid and
unpaid labor on the risk of divorce in two countries with varying levels
of institutional support for a male breadwinner model. These institutional
differences, however, can manifest indirectly as well, reflecting other gen-
der differences in relative bargaining power. As noted earlier, if wives
have not accrued work experience because they have been reliant on a
male breadwinner, having children increases their dependence and in-
ability to leave the marriage. In West Germany, where the majority of
households are male breadwinner households, the presence of children
significantly reduces the risk of divorce. The effect is linear, so each ad-
ditional German child further reduces the risk of divorce. In contrast, in
the United States, where the vast majority of couples have two earners
so that the vast majority of wives have some accrued work experience,
the number of children does not alter the risk of divorce, a result also
found by others (South 2001; Waite and Lillard 1991).
Another difference in effects that might stem from the difference in the
degree to which policy encourages couples’ economic interdependence
versus wives’ dependence is that of home ownership. In the United States,
the interest paid on home mortgages or loans secured with one’s home is
tax deductible. This provides U.S. married women with an incentive to
join the labor force, enabling the family to afford a larger home in a better
neighborhood, which enhances a husband’s status as well. There are some
deductions related to home ownership in Germany, but they are capped
to a very modest level. As evident in table 2, home ownership reduces
the log odds of divorce in both countries. The effect, however, is more
than five times as great in the United States as in Germany (1.23 vs.
0.23, respectively) and is only statistically significant in the United States
for these young couples. While other differences, such as the desirability
of the rental sectors in the two countries, might account for part of this
difference, it is also possible that the economic interdependence within
couples created by the U.S. home mortgage tax provisions is a significant
factor. Future research might explore the effect of policies promoting
greater couple economic interdependence, as an antidote to the negative
effects found here of policy reinforcement of the traditional male bread-
winner model and women’s economic dependence.
housework hours)  2.25 interaction effect that the husband does no more than half
of domestic tasks] p 2.66). In female breadwinner couples where the husband does
no domestic tasks, the predicted net change in the risk of divorce is still less than zero
([(100#0.02 wife’s earnings) (0.03#13.50 employed wife’s mean housework hours)
 2.25 interaction term] p 0.66).
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DISCUSSION: DOING GENDER IN CONTEXT AND ITS EFFECTS ON
MARITAL STABILITY
Like a Russian doll, how we “do” gender is embedded in its historical
sociopolitical context. Consequently, gender relations vary across insti-
tutional contexts, with the hierarchy evident in and replicated by the
gendered division of labor in society (Hartmann 1981; Lewis 1992). Only
recently, however, have policy influences and resultant divisions been
compared across societies (Baxter 1997; Bittman et al. 2003; Davis and
Greenstein 2004; Fuwa 2004), and none of these analyses compared effects
of varying household divisions of paid and unpaid labor on marital sta-
bility. The specialization and trading model claims the traditional gen-
dered division of labor reinforced in some sociopolitical contexts is optimal
for marital stability. Social exchange and bargaining models contend that
women’s rising economic equality with men alters the credibility of threat
points such as divorce through which more equitable distributions of
household labor can be negotiated. Under these models, equitable divi-
sions of household paid and unpaid labor reflect distributive justice that
should enhance marital stability.
Here, the household division of labor and its effects on marital stability
of couples first married between 1985 and 1995 are compared in the United
States and the former West Germany. U.S. liberal policy encourages female
labor force participation while remaining silent on the private sphere,
whereas West Germany implemented policies after World War II rein-
forcing women’s legal responsibility for the home and economic depen-
dence on a male breadwinner. With this historical reinforcement of the
gendered division of labor, more West German couples report the wife is
out of the labor force as compared with U.S. couples, where dual-earner
couples are the norm. When a West German wife is employed, she per-
forms more domestic tasks, displaying more compensating domestic be-
havior for her nontraditional economic role than do U.S. wives. This is
similar to evidence for couples in Australia, another strong male bread-
winner country relative to the United States (Bittman et al. 2003), and
the variation in individual effects across countries found by Fuwa (2004).
Together these findings highlight that it is not sufficient to look at indi-
vidual resources in making predictions regarding the household division
of labor; we must situate effects within the institutional setting, partic-
ularly the extent to which policy reinforces the gendered division of labor.
This determines the extent to which a gendered division of labor is done
within the intimate sphere of the home.
As a counterargument, one might assert that other cultural differences
explain both the traditional policies and effects found for West Germany
as compared with the United States. Yet the former East Germany shares
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a common cultural past with West Germany while the people were so-
cialized for two generations under divergent policies affecting the division
of labor. After World War II, East Germany adopted a Stalinist consti-
tution that enforced women’s obligation to work (Moeller 1993). To sup-
port maternal employment, East Germany passed the 1950 Mother and
Child Care and Women’s Rights Acts, establishing a network of public
child care centers, kindergartens, and facilities for free school meals, and
maternity leave and days off to tend sick children (Ostner 1993; Zim-
merman 1993). The state also mandated developing women’s skill cre-
dentials through education and vocational training, and a larger propor-
tion of East German women attended professional colleges and university
than in West Germany (Budde 1999). Recent evidence indicates that even
after economic reunification, the division of housework is significantly
more egalitarian in the former East than in West Germany (Cooke 2004),
and is similar to the division reported here for U.S. couples. These dif-
ferences within Germany suggest it is not just culture reflected in the
divergent household divisions of labor in West Germany as compared
with the United States, but also state policy.
The institutional context shapes more than the household division of
labor; it also varies the effects of different divisions of paid and unpaid
labor on marital stability. Gender specialization proves optimal for marital
stability in the country with institutional support for this model: West
German male breadwinner couples are the most stable in that country,
and any movement away from this in terms of wives’ relative earnings
or husbands’ relative housework increases the risk of divorce. In contrast,
equitable distributions of the household division of labor predicted under
social exchange models appear optimal in the United States where policy
remains silent on the private sphere and market effects meander their
laissez-faire course. At the extremes, however, both U.S. male and female
breadwinner couples are at greater risk of divorce. Yet female breadwin-
ner couples neutralizing gender deviance by having wives perform an
equal share of domestic tasks are more stable than traditional male bread-
winner couples in either country.
These results suggest important extensions of our understanding of
gender relations. First, the competing theories of effects of the household
division of labor both hold true; which holds true depends upon the degree
to which theorized dynamics are supported by institutional factors such
as policies. This suggests that the slow evolution in the division of domestic
tasks observed over the past half century may not result from persistent
gender differences, but from continuing institutional reinforcement of the
gendered division of labor (see also Breen and Cooke 2005). Change is
not revolutionary as initially predicted by Hochschild (1989); policies af-
fect the progress of the evolution toward greater gender equity.
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Second, where the evolution is not thwarted by policies reinforcing
traditional gender hierarchies, men’s greater participation in domestic
tasks results in more stable marriages regardless of women’s employment.
This finding raises questions regarding the wisdom of calls from conser-
vative quarters to reinforce the traditional male breadwinner family to
turn the tide of increasing family instability. Further, a gendered division
of labor leaves women and their children economically vulnerable under
macroeconomic conditions that are more volatile than those of the 1960s.
For example, unemployment in West Germany was just 0.5% in 1965,
rising during the 1980s and 1990s to 7% or 8% (OECD 1978, 2000). Most
vulnerable during periods of high unemployment are persons with low
skills and little experience, such as traditional housewives. Single female
heads of household are more likely to be poor and reliant on state transfers
(Daly and Rake 2003). Consequently, reinforcement of the male bread-
winner model appears of little benefit to women, children, or the state.
One might lament that U.S. female breadwinners must carry a one-
and-one-half burden of paid and unpaid labor to ensure marital stability.
Women employed full-time, however, reduce their domestic hours, so such
women’s greater domestic share is based upon fewer total housework
hours to be divided between the wife and husband. In addition, we cannot
tell with these data the extent to which performing the remaining house-
hold tasks represents an expression of love and caring rather than a burden
(Ferree 1990). Future research needs to decipher, however, what U.S.
husbands that contribute little to either paid or unpaid labor do contribute
to marriage to make them more successful than traditional ones.
More generally, the results shed no light on the process by which the
household division of labor might lead to marital instability. Does the
household division of labor alter marital quality, or do different divisions
only alter the risk of divorce within unhappy marriages as found by
Schoen and his colleagues (2002)? There is also a tacit assumption within
both models that women initiate divorce, either because they no longer
economically require men (specialization and trading model), or because
men fail to take on more equitable divisions of domestic tasks (social
exchange model). Given that different household divisions of labor appear
optimal in different countries, our understanding of gender relations
would deepen with exploration into which partner under what circum-
stances terminates the relationship under different policy configurations.
We remain somewhat cautious in our conclusions, however, because
even among the more recent group of first-married couples analyzed here,
female primary breadwinning couples are still outliers. Wives earned more
than 75% of the income in only 13% of U.S. and 7% of West German
couples in the sample. Still, the results highlight the idea that distributive
justice prevails where gender hierarchies are not reinforced. Policy is
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instrumental in setting gender hierarchies, with the evidence here indi-
cating that policy encouraging gender equity encourages family economic
flexibility and marital stability. In other words, gender equity represents
more than a feminist ideal; it proves essential for sustaining healthy post-
industrial societies. Neither the United States nor Germany, however, has
policy provisions actively supporting maternal employment and encour-
aging men’s participation in the domestic sphere, particularly in child
care, such as those found in Scandinavian countries (Gauthier 2005; Gor-
nick and Meyers 2003). Future comparative research needs to look at the
household divisions of labor and effects of these on family outcomes across
a wider array of state, market, and gender relations.
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